This paper presents results of a study concerning the generation strategic bids for a single hour.
NOMENCLATURE
-
INTRODUCTION
t's desirable that the electricity market work in a perfect competition. However, due to the limited number of generation companies (lack of competitors), due to the high investment (one of the biggest barriers to new players), due to the long period of time taking from the planning to the exploration of a plant, the grid capacity and the transmission losses, the markets tend to work as an Oligopoly. Thereby, some companies can have a significant market share and make strategic bids to improve their profit. The study of the market behaviour with the conjectural parameter, developed in 1924 by Bowley and in 1933 by Frisch, was used by several authors [3] , [4] , [5] but only to simulate oligopoly markets with linear bids and determining just one strategic bid. The experience shows us that the normal distribution is the one that best represents the market prices [6] . When we consider a normal price distribution, the block surplus function is more complicated than when we consider an uniform price distribution. [1] .
FORMULATION
I consider a market with several companies that bid by blocks, each block is identified by i. The block i surplus depends on both strategic bids: price and quantity. For each strategic bid it is assumed that all the companies want to maximize the surplus of each block separately. I assume that the demand is elastic, allowing the price to change with the demand. Also, it is assumed that the market price depends on the demand, as illustrated in Thereby, the market price can be ruled by the equation:
The value e is the maximum price when the demand is equal to the minimum quantity, min P , and isn't equal to max λ . 
Dispatch merit order-the place of renewable energy
Where gi P -is the aggregated opponents quantity strategic bid.
The value ' s ' is the slope of the demand curve and is associated with the consumer's reaction. According to equation (1) and (2): ) ( It's assumed that θ is constant for each case study.
Thereby,
K is the expected market price for the minimum value of ) ,
is the market price difference to the market assuming a rigid demand.
The quantity strategic bid is
consider that the quantity strategic bid is the respective active restriction.
The selling price, sell i λ , depends on the quantities. In the MCP market, the active participant's payment is equal to the marginal price. In the PAB market, the active participant's payment is equal to their bid. In the MCP market, the block i will sell less quantity at a higher price. In the PAB market, the probability of dispatch of the block i is higher for the blocks that I studied the market behaviour assuming that the market price is represented by a normal probability function. With the normal probability function I assumed that the market price has higher probability to be in the middle of the reliable range [ 
where (.) u is the step function. 
CASE STUDY

1) For the MCP market
In the MCP market, the selling price, According to the option that leads to higher expected surplus for block i. According to the strategic bids, the maximum expected surplus for block i is a) if 
RESULTS
The results are for the following cases: 
CONCLUSIONS
I assume that the companies have price and quantity strategic bids to maximize their surplus. According to the tables in appendix, we can see that the influence of all technologies is bigger in the MCP market than in the PAB market, when I assume a normal price distribution. The demand satisfied is lower and the market price is higher in the MCP market than in the PAB market. Also, when the emission externality is introduced as a production cost, the surplus is lower. Therefore, the market can work as an incentive for sustainability.
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